CS590 Seminar: Algorithmic Aspects of Information in Games

Basic information

• Meeting Time: Fridays 2pm - 3:20pm
• Meeting Place: SAL 222
• Instructors: Shaddin Dughmi and David Kempe
  • Email: shaddin@usc.edu and dkempe@usc.edu

Announcements

• Sep8: Website is live. Please choose papers by Wednesday. First two lectures will be by Shaddin and David.

Papers

• Introduction to Information Economics
  • Shaddin (Sept 13): The Market for Lemons and Job Market Signaling
    • Additional References: Chapter 13 of Mas-Colell Whinston Green, Silver Signals, and Chapter 18 of Kreps
• Descriptive results on information in Auctions
  • David (Sept 20): A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding and Chapters 7-8 of Krishna
  • Eric (Sept 27) :Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design
  • Debarun (Oct 4): Ad Auctions with Data
• Information Structures and Equilibria
  • Haifeng (Oct 18): Bayesian Persuasion
  • Albert (Oct 25): Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures
  • Fei (Nov 1): Signaling and Mediation in Games with Common Interests
  • Hoyee (Nov 15): Positive Value of Information in Games
• Optimal Choice of Information Structures
  • Yu (Oct 11): Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization and Send Mixed Signals
  • Ruixin (Nov 29): The Limits of Price Discrimination
  • Ayushman (Dec 6): Information Structures in Optimal Auctions
  • Li (Dec 18 2:00-3:30): Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions
  • Parisa (Dec 19 1:00 - 2:30): Auctions and Information Acquisition
  • Ehsan (Dec 19 2:30-4:00): Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information