# CS672: Approximation Algorithms Spring 2020 Linear Programming Review

Instructor: Shaddin Dughmi

## **Outline**

- Linear Programming Basics
- Duality and Its Interpretations
- Properties of Duals
- Weak and Strong Duality
- Consequences of Duality
- 6 Uses and Examples of Duality
- Solvability of LP

### **Outline**

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- Weak and Strong Duality
- Consequences of Duality
- Uses and Examples of Duality
- Solvability of LP

#### LP General Form

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize (or maximize)} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & a_i^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ & a_i^{\mathsf{T}}x \end{array}$ 

$$\begin{split} c^\intercal x \\ a_i^\intercal x &\leq b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in \mathcal{C}^1. \\ a_i^\intercal x &\geq b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in \mathcal{C}^2. \\ a_i^\intercal x &= b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in \mathcal{C}^3. \end{split}$$

- Decision variables:  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$
- Parameters:
  - $c \in \mathbb{R}^n$  defines the linear objective function
  - $a_i \in \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $b_i \in \mathbb{R}$  define the *i*'th constraint.


#### Standard Form

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^\intercal x \\ \text{subject to} & a_i^\intercal x \leq b_i, \quad \text{for } i=1,\dots,m. \\ & x_j \geq 0, \qquad \text{for } j=1,\dots,n. \end{array}$$


#### Every LP can be transformed to this form

- minimizing  $c^{\mathsf{T}}x$  is equivalent to maximizing  $-c^{\mathsf{T}}x$
- $\bullet \ge \text{constraints can be flipped by multiplying by } -1$
- Each equality constraint can be replaced by two inequalities
- Uconstrained variable  $x_j$  can be replaced by  $x_j^+ x_j^-$ , where both  $x_j^+$  and  $x_j^-$  are constrained to be nonnegative.

# Geometric View




# Geometric View



# A 2-D example

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & x_1+x_2\\ \text{subject to} & x_1+2x_2 \leq 2\\ & 2x_1+x_2 \leq 2\\ & x_1,x_2 \geq 0 \end{array}$$




# **Application: Optimal Production**

- n products, m raw materials
- Every unit of product j uses  $a_{ij}$  units of raw material i
- There are  $b_i$  units of material i available
- Product j yields profit  $c_j$  per unit
- Facility wants to maximize profit subject to available raw materials

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```

# **Terminology**

- Hyperplane: The region defined by a linear equality
- Halfspace: The region defined by a linear inequality  $a_i^{\mathsf{T}} x \leq b_i$ .
- Polyhedron: The intersection of a set of linear inequalities
  - Feasible region of an LP is a polyhedron
- Polytope: Bounded polyhedron
  - Equivalently: convex hull of a finite set of points
- Vertex: A point x is a vertex of polyhedron P if  $\not\exists y \neq 0$  with  $x+y \in P$  and  $x-y \in P$
- Face of P: The intersection with P of a hyperplane H disjoint from the interior of P



#### **Fact**

Feasible regions of LPs (i.e. polyhedrons) are convex

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Set of optimal solutions of an LP is convex

- In fact, a face of the polyhedron
- intersection of P with hyperplane  $c^{\mathsf{T}}x = OPT$

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
- In fact, a face of the polyhedron
- intersection of P with hyperplane  $c^{\mathsf{T}}x = OPT$

#### **Fact**

A feasible point x is a vertex if and only if n linearly independent constraints are tight (i.e., satisfied with equality) at x.

#### **Fact**

An LP either has an optimal solution, or is unbounded or infeasible



Linear Programming Basics

If an LP in standard form has an optimal solution, then it has a vertex optimal solution.

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#### **Proof**

 Assume not, and take a non-vertex optimal solution x with the maximum number of tight constraints

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- Assume not, and take a non-vertex optimal solution x with the maximum number of tight constraints
- There is  $y \neq 0$  s.t.  $x \pm y$  are feasible
- y is perpendicular to the objective function and the tight constraints at x.
  - i.e.  $c^{\mathsf{T}}y = 0$ , and  $a_i^{\mathsf{T}}y = 0$  whenever the *i*'th constraint is tight for x.

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- Let  $\alpha$  be the largest constant such that  $x + \alpha y$  is feasible
  - Such an  $\alpha$  exists

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- Can choose y s.t.  $y_j < 0$  for some j
- Let  $\alpha$  be the largest constant such that  $x + \alpha y$  is feasible
  - Such an  $\alpha$  exists
- An additional constraint becomes tight at  $x + \alpha y$ , a contradiction.

# Counting non-zero Variables

#### Corollary

If an LP in standard form has an optimal solution, then there is an optimal solution with at most m non-zero variables.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & a_i^{\mathsf{T}}x \leq b_i, \quad \text{for } i=1,\ldots,m. \\ & x_j \geq 0, \qquad \text{for } j=1,\ldots,n. \end{array}$$

ullet e.g. for optimal production with n products and m raw materials, there is an optimal plan with at most m products.

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# **Linear Programming Duality**

#### Primal LP

maximize  $c^{\mathsf{T}}x$  subject to  $Ax \leq b$ 

#### **Dual LP**

- $\bullet$   $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}, c \in \mathbb{R}^n, b \in \mathbb{R}^m$
- $y_i$  is the dual variable corresponding to primal constraint  $A_i x \leq b_i$
- ullet  $A_j^Ty=c_j$  is the dual constraint corresponding to primal variable  $x_j$

# Linear Programming Duality: Standard Form, and Visualization

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

#### **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & y^{\mathsf{T}}b \\ \text{subject to} & A^{\mathsf{T}}y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

# Linear Programming Duality: Standard Form, and Visualization

## Primal LP


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
#### Dual LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & y^\intercal b \\ \text{subject to} & A^\intercal y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_3$	$x_4$	
$y_1$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12}$		$a_{14}$	$b_1$
$y_2$	$a_{21}$	$a_{22}$	$a_{23}$	$a_{24}$	$b_2$
$y_3$	$a_{31}$	$a_{32}$	$a_{33}$	$a_{34}$	$b_3$
	$c_1$	$c_2$	$c_3$	$c_4$	

# Linear Programming Duality: Standard Form, and Visualization





	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_3$	$x_4$	
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	$c_1$	$c_2$	$c_3$	$\overline{c_4}$	

- $y_i$  is the dual variable corresponding to primal constraint  $A_i x \leq b_i$
- $A_i^T y \ge c_j$  is the dual constraint corresponding to primal variable  $x_j$

Recall the Optimal Production problem from last lecture

- n products, m raw materials
- Every unit of product j uses  $a_{ij}$  units of raw material i
- There are  $b_i$  units of material i available
- Product j yields profit  $c_j$  per unit
- Facility wants to maximize profit subject to available raw materials

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \max & \sum_{j=1}^n c_j x_j \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij} x_j \leq b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in [m]. \\ & x_j \geq 0, \qquad \qquad \text{for } j \in [n]. \end{array}$ 

#### Primal LP

#### **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{llll} \max & \sum_{j=1}^n c_j x_j & \min & \sum_{i=1}^m b_i y_i \\ \mathrm{s.t.} & \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij} x_j \leq b_i, & \mathrm{for} \ i \in [m]. & \mathrm{s.t.} & \sum_{i=1}^m a_{ij} y_i \geq c_j, & \mathrm{for} \ j \in [n]. \end{array}$  $x_i \geq 0,$  for  $j \in [n]$ .  $y_i \geq 0,$  for  $i \in [m]$ .

#### Primal LP

$$\begin{array}{ll} \max & \sum_{j=1}^n c_j x_j \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij} x_j \leq b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in [m] \\ & x_j \geq 0, \qquad \qquad \text{for } j \in [n]. \end{array}$$

#### **Dual LP**

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	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_3$	$x_4$	
$y_1$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12} \\ a_{22} \\ a_{32}$	$a_{13}$	$a_{14}$	$b_1$
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#### Dual LP

$\sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i$ $\sum_{i=1}^{m} a_{ij} y_i \ge c_j,$ $y_i \ge 0,$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{for } j \in [n]. \\ \text{for } i \in [m]. \end{array}$
<i>30</i> — - )	[].
	$\sum_{i=1}^{m} a_{ij} y_i \ge c_j,$

	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_3$	$x_4$	
21	_				h
$y_1$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12} \\ a_{22} \\ a_{32}$	$a_{13}$	$a_{14}$	$v_1$
$y_2$	$a_{21}$	$a_{22}$	$a_{23}$	$a_{24}$	$b_2$
$y_3$	$a_{31}$	$a_{32}$	$a_{33}$	$a_{34}$	$b_3$
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- Dual variable  $y_i$  is a proposed price per unit of raw material i
- Dual price vector is feasible if facility has incentive to sell materials

• Buyer wants to spend as little as possible to buy materials

#### Consider the simple LP from last lecture

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & x_1+x_2\\ \text{subject to} & x_1+2x_2\leq 2\\ & 2x_1+x_2\leq 2\\ & x_1,x_2\geq 0 \end{array}$$

• We found that the optimal solution was at  $(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$ , with an optimal value of 4/3.

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- We found that the optimal solution was at  $(\frac{2}{3}, \frac{2}{3})$ , with an optimal value of 4/3.
- What if, instead of finding the optimal solution, we saught to find an upperbound on its value by combining inequalities?
  - Each inequality implies an upper bound of 2
  - Multiplying each by  $\frac{1}{3}$  and summing gives  $x_1 + x_2 \le 4/3$ .

	$x_1$		$x_3$	$x_4$	
$y_1$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12}$	$a_{13}$ $a_{23}$ $a_{33}$	$a_{14}$	$b_1$
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• Multiplying each row i by  $y_i$  and summing gives the inequality

$$y^T A x \le y^T b$$

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	$c_1$	$c_2$	$c_3$	$c_4$	

• Multiplying each row i by  $y_i$  and summing gives the inequality

$$y^T A x \le y^T b$$

• When  $y^TA \ge c^T$ , the right hand side of the inequality is an upper bound on  $c^Tx$  for every feasible x.

$$c^Tx \leq y^TAx \leq y^Tb$$

## Interpretation 2: Finding the Best Upperbound

	$x_1$	$x_2$		$x_4$	
$y_1$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12} \\ a_{22} \\ a_{32}$	$a_{13}$	$a_{14}$	$b_1$
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
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
• When  $y^T A \ge c^T$ , the right hand side of the inequality is an upper bound on  $c^T x$  for every feasible x.

$$c^T x \le y^T A x \le y^T b$$


 The dual LP can be thought of as trying to find the best upperbound on the primal that can be achieved this way.




• Apply force field c to a ball inside bounded polytope  $Ax \leq b$ .




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- Wall  $a_i x \leq b_i$  applies some force  $-y_i a_i$  to the ball
- Since the ball is still,  $c^T = \sum_i y_i a_i = y^T A$ .



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- Since the ball is still,  $c^T = \sum_i y_i a_i = y^T A$ .
- Dual can be thought of as trying to minimize "work"  $\sum_i y_i b_i$  to bring ball back to origin by moving polytope
- We will see that, at optimality, only the walls adjacent to the ball push (Complementary Slackness)

Duality and Its Interpretations

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## Duality is an Inversion

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

### **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & b^{\intercal}y\\ \text{subject to} & A^{\intercal}y\succeq c\\ & y\succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

### Duality is an Inversion

Given a primal LP in standard form, the dual of its dual is itself.

Properties of Duals 17/37

## Correspondance Between Variables and Constraints

#### Primal LP

max  $\sum_{j=1}^{n} c_j x_j$ s.t.  $\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{ij} x_j \le b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in [m].$   $\sum_{j=1}^{m} a_{ij} y_j \ge c_j, \quad \text{for } j \in [n].$   $y_i \ge 0, \quad \text{for } i \in [m].$ 

#### **Dual LP**

min  $\sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i$ s.t.

Properties of Duals 18/37

## Correspondance Between Variables and Constraints

#### Primal LP

```
\max \quad \sum_{j=1}^{n} c_j x_j
s.t.
```

#### **Dual LP**

```
min \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i
             s.t.
```

• The i'th primal constraint gives rise to the i'th dual variable  $y_i$ 

Properties of Duals 18/37

## Correspondance Between Variables and Constraints

#### Primal LP

```
\max \quad \sum_{j=1}^{n} c_j x_j
s.t.
```

#### **Dual LP**

```
min \sum_{i=1}^{m} b_i y_i
s.t.
```

- The i'th primal constraint gives rise to the i'th dual variable  $y_i$
- The j'th primal variable  $x_i$  gives rise to the j'th dual constraint

Properties of Duals 18/37

# Syntactic Rules

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \max & c^{\intercal}x \\ \text{s.t.} \end{array}$ 

 $y_i: \quad a_i x \leq b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in \mathcal{C}_1.$   $y_i: \quad a_i x = b_i, \quad \text{for } i \in \mathcal{C}_2.$ 

 $x_j \ge 0$ , for  $j \in \mathcal{D}_1$ .  $x_j \in \mathbb{R}$ , for  $j \in \mathcal{D}_2$ .

 $j \in \mathbb{R}$ , for  $j \in \mathcal{D}_2$ .

### Dual LP

min  $b^{\mathsf{T}}y$  s.t.

 $x_j: \ \overline{a}_i^{\mathsf{T}} y \geq c_j, \ \text{ for } j \in \mathcal{D}_1.$ 

 $x_j: \overline{a}_j^\intercal y = c_j, \text{ for } j \in \mathcal{D}_2.$ 

 $y_i \ge 0,$  for  $i \in \mathcal{C}_1$ .

 $y_i \in \mathbb{R}, \quad \text{for } i \in \mathcal{C}_2.$ 

### Rules of Thumb

- Lenient constraint (i.e. inequality) ⇒ stringent dual variable (i.e. nonnegative)
- Stringent constraint (i.e. equality) ⇒ lenient dual variable (i.e. unconstrained)

Properties of Duals 19/37

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## Weak Duality

#### Primal LP

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### **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & b^{\mathsf{T}}y \\ \text{subject to} & A^{\mathsf{T}}y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

### Theorem (Weak Duality)

For every primal feasible x and dual feasible y, we have  $c^{\intercal}x \leq b^{\intercal}y$ .

### Corollary

- If primal and dual both feasible and bounded,  $OPT(Primal) \leq OPT(Dual)$
- If primal is unbounded, dual is infeasible
- If dual is unbounded, primal is infeasible

## Weak Duality

#### Primal LP

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### Theorem (Weak Duality)

For every primal feasible x and dual feasible y, we have  $c^{\intercal}x \leq b^{\intercal}y$ .

### Corollary

If  $x^*$  is primal feasible, and  $y^*$  is dual feasible, and  $c^{\intercal}x^* = b^{\intercal}y^*$ , then both are optimal.

# Interpretation of Weak Duality

### **Economic Interpretation**

If selling the raw materials is more profitable than making any individual product, then total money collected from sale of raw materials would exceed profit from production.

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Self explanatory

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If selling the raw materials is more profitable than making any individual product, then total money collected from sale of raw materials would exceed profit from production.

### Upperbound Interpretation

Self explanatory

### Physical Interpretation

Work required to bring ball back to origin by pulling polytope is at least potential energy difference between origin and primal optimum.

# **Proof of Weak Duality**

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

### Dual LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & b^{\mathsf{T}}y \\ \text{subject to} & A^{\mathsf{T}}y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

$$c^{\mathsf{T}}x \leq y^{\mathsf{T}}Ax \leq y^{\mathsf{T}}b$$

# Strong Duality

### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succ 0 \end{array}$ 

### **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & b^{\mathsf{T}}y \\ \text{subject to} & A^{\mathsf{T}}y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

### Theorem (Strong Duality)

If either the primal or dual is feasible and bounded, then so is the other and OPT(Primal) = OPT(Dual).

# Interpretation of Strong Duality

### **Economic Interpretation**

Buyer can offer prices for raw materials that would make facility indifferent between production and sale.

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The method of scaling and summing inequalities yields a tight upperbound on the primal optimal value.

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
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
There is an assignment of forces to the walls of the polytope that brings ball back to the origin without wasting energy.

# Informal Proof of Strong Duality




Recall the physical interpretation of duality

# Informal Proof of Strong Duality



- Recall the physical interpretation of duality
- When ball is stationary at x, we expect force c to be neutralized only by constraints that are tight. i.e. force multipliers  $y \succeq 0$  s.t.
  - $\quad \bullet \ y^{\intercal}A = c$
  - $y_i(b_i a_i x) = 0$

# Informal Proof of Strong Duality



- Recall the physical interpretation of duality
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  - $y^{\mathsf{T}}A = c$
  - $y_i(b_i a_i x) = 0$

$$y^{\mathsf{T}}b - c^{\mathsf{T}}x = y^{\mathsf{T}}b - y^{\mathsf{T}}Ax = \sum_{i} y_{i}(b_{i} - a_{i}x) = 0$$

We found a primal and dual solution that are equal in value!

Weak and Strong Duality

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## **Outline**

- Linear Programming Basics
- Duality and Its Interpretations
- Properties of Duals
- Weak and Strong Duality
- Consequences of Duality
- Uses and Examples of Duality
- Solvability of LF

## Complementary Slackness

### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succ 0 \end{array}$ 

### **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & y^{\mathsf{T}}b \\ \text{subject to} & A^{\mathsf{T}}y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

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 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{minimize} & y^\intercal b \\ \text{subject to} & A^\intercal y \succeq c \\ & y \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

- Let  $s_i = (b Ax)_i$  be the *i*'th primal slack variable
- Let  $t_j = (A^{\mathsf{T}}y c)_j$  be the j'th dual slack variable

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### Complementary Slackness

Feasible  $\boldsymbol{x}$  and  $\boldsymbol{y}$  are optimal if and only if

- $x_i t_i = 0$  for all  $j = 1, \ldots, n$
- $y_i s_i = 0$  for all i = 1, ..., m

	$x_1$	$x_2$	$x_3$	$x_4$	
$y_1$	$a_{11}$	$a_{12}$	$a_{13}$	$a_{14}$	$b_1$
$y_2$	$a_{21}$	$a_{12} \\ a_{22} \\ a_{32}$	$a_{23}$	$a_{24}$	$b_2$
$y_3$	$a_{31}$	$a_{32}$	$a_{33}$	$a_{34}$	$b_3$
	$c_1$	$c_2$	$c_3$	$c_4$	

# Interpretation of Complementary Slackness

### **Economic Interpretation**


Given an optimal primal production vector x and optimal dual offer prices y,

- Facility produces only products for which it is indifferent between sale and production.
- $\bullet$  Only raw materials that are binding constraints on production are priced greater than 0

## Interpretation of Complementary Slackness

### Physical Interpretation

Only walls adjacent to the balls equilibrium position push back on it.



#### Primal LP

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succeq 0 \end{array}$ 

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$$y^{\mathsf{T}}b - c^{\mathsf{T}}x = y^{\mathsf{T}}(Ax + s) - (y^{\mathsf{T}}A - t^{\mathsf{T}})x = y^{\mathsf{T}}s + t^{\mathsf{T}}x$$

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Gap between primal and dual objectives is 0 if and only if complementary slackness holds.

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- Complementary slackness allows us to recover the primal optimal from the dual optimal, and vice versa.

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# Primal LP (n variables, m+n constraints)

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```

## **Dual LP**

(m variables, m+n constraints)

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  - ullet Exactly n dual constraints are loose

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Consequences of Duality 29/37

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maximize c^{\intercal}x
subject to Ax \leq b
x \succ 0
```

## Dual LP

```
(m \text{ variables, } m+n \text{ constraints})

minimize y^{\mathsf{T}}b

subject to A^{\mathsf{T}}y \succeq c
```

 $y \succ 0$ 

- Let y be dual optimal. By non-degeneracy:
  - Exactly m of the m+n dual constraints are tight at y
  - Exactly n dual constraints are loose
- ullet n loose dual constraints impose n tight primal constraints
  - Assuming non-degeneracy, solving the linear equation yields a unique primal optimum solution x.

Consequences of Duality 29/37

## **Outline**

- Linear Programming Basics
- Duality and Its Interpretations
- Properties of Duals
- Weak and Strong Duality
- Consequences of Duality
- 6 Uses and Examples of Duality
- Solvability of LP

# Uses of Duality in Algorithm Design

- Gain structural insights
  - Dual of a problem gives a "different way of looking at it".
- As a benchmark; i.e. to certify (approximate) optimality
  - The primal/dual paradigm
  - A dual may be explicitly constructed by the algorithm, or as part of its analysis


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
Let's look at some duals and interpret them.

#### **Shortest Path**

Given a directed network G=(V,E) where edge e has length  $\ell_e\in\mathbb{R}_+$ , find the minimum cost path from s to t.



## **Shortest Path**




#### Primal LP

$$\begin{array}{lll} \min & \sum_{e \in E} \ell_e x_e \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum_{e \to v} x_e - \sum_{v \to e} x_e = \delta_v, & \forall v \in V. \\ x_e \geq 0, & \forall e \in E. \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{ll} \max & y_t - y_s \\ \text{s.t.} & y_v - y_u \leq \ell_e, & \forall (u,v) \in E. \end{array}$$

### **Dual LP**

Where  $\delta_v = -1$  if v = s, 1 if v = t, and 0 otherwise.

## **Shortest Path**



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**Dual LP** 

Where  $\delta_v = -1$  if v = s, 1 if v = t, and 0 otherwise.

### Interpretation of Dual

Stretch s and t as far apart as possible, subject to edge lengths.

# Maximum Weighted Bipartite Matching

Set B of buyers, and set G of goods. Buyer i has value  $w_{ij}$  for good j, and interested in at most one good. Find maximum value assignment of goods to buyers.

# Maximum Weighted Bipartite Matching

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{aligned} & \max & & \sum_{i,j} w_{ij} x_{ij} \\ & \text{s.t.} & & \sum_{j \in G} x_{ij} \leq 1, & \forall i \in B. \end{aligned}$ 

 $\sum_{j \in G} x_{ij} \le 1, \quad \forall i \in B.$   $\sum_{i \in B} x_{ij} \le 1, \quad \forall j \in G.$   $x_{ij} \ge 0, \quad \forall i \in B, j \in A$ 

## **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \min & \sum\limits_{i \in B} u_i + \sum\limits_{j \in G} p_j \\ \text{s.t.} & u_i + p_j \geq w_{ij}, \quad \forall i \in B, j \in G, \\ u_i \geq 0, & \forall i \in B. \\ p_j \geq 0, & \forall j \in G. \end{array}$ 

# Maximum Weighted Bipartite Matching

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### Interpretation of Dual

- ullet  $p_j$  is price of good j
- u<sub>i</sub> is utility of buyer i
- Complementary Slackness:
  - A buyer i only grabs goods j maximizing  $w_{ij} p_j$
  - Only fully assigned goods have non-zero price
  - A buyer with nonzero utility must receive an item

## Minimum Cost Set Cover

Elements  $[n]=\{1,\ldots,n\}$ , sets  $S_1,\ldots,S_m\subseteq [n]$  with weights  $w_1,\ldots,w_m\geq 0$ . Find minimum weight collection of sets whose union is [n].

## Minimum Cost Set Cover

#### Primal LP

 $\begin{aligned} & \min & & \sum_{j=1}^m w_j x_j \\ & \text{s.t.} & & \sum_{j:S_j\ni i}^m x_j \geq 1, & \forall i\in[n]. \\ & & & x_j \geq 0, & \forall j\in[m]. \end{aligned}$ 

## **Dual LP**

 $\begin{array}{ll} \max & \sum\limits_{i=1}^n y_i \\ \text{s.t.} & \sum\limits_{i \in S_j} y_i \leq w_j, \quad \forall j \in [m]. \\ & y_i \geq 0, \qquad \forall i \in [n]. \end{array}$ 

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#### Interpretation of Dual

Trying to "sell" coverage to elements at prices  $y_i$ .

- Objective: Maximize revenue
- Feasible: charge elements in  $S_j$  no more than it would cost them if they broke away and bought  $S_j$  themselves
- Complementary Slackness:
  - Only select sets that are "paid for" by the dual prices
  - Only elements that are covered exactly once are charged.

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# Solvability of Explicit Linear Programs

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & c^{\mathsf{T}}x \\ \text{subject to} & Ax \preceq b \\ & x \succeq 0 \end{array}$$

- In the examples we have seen so far, the linear program is explicit.
- I.e. the constraint matrix A, as well as rhs vector b and objective c, are either given directly as input, or are of size polynomial in the description size of the instance.

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#### Theorem (Polynomial Solvability of Explicit LP)

There is a polynomial time algorithm for linear programming, when the linear program is represented explicitly.

Originally using the ellipsoid algorithm, and more recently interior-point algorithms which are more efficient in practice.

# Implicit Linear Programs

- These are linear programs in which the number of constraints is exponential (in the natural description of the input)
- These are useful as an analytical tool
- Can be solved in many cases!

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- These are linear programs in which the number of constraints is exponential (in the natural description of the input)
- These are useful as an analytical tool
- Can be solved in many cases!
- E.g. Held-Karp relaxation for TSP



min s.t.

$$0 \leq x \leq 1$$

$$\sum_{e \in E} d_e x_e$$

$$x(\delta(S)) \ge 2, \quad \forall \emptyset \subset S \subset V.$$

$$x(\delta(v)) = 2, \quad \forall v \in V.$$

Where  $\delta(S)$  denotes the edges going out of  $S \subseteq V$ .

# Solvability of Implicit Linear Programs

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#### Theorem (Polynomial Solvability of Implicit LP)

Consider a family  $\Pi$  of linear programming problems I = (A, b, c) admitting the following operations in polynomial time (in  $\langle I \rangle$  and n):

- A separation oracle for the polyhedron  $Ax \leq b$
- Explicit access to c

Moreover, assume that every  $\langle a_{ij} \rangle$ ,  $\langle b_i \rangle$ ,  $\langle c_j \rangle$  are at most  $\operatorname{poly}(\langle I \rangle, n)$ . Then there is a polynomial time algorithm for  $\Pi$  (both primal and dual).

#### Separation oracle

An algorithm that takes as input  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ , and either certifies  $Ax \leq b$  or finds a violated constraint  $a_i x > b_i$ .



$$\begin{array}{ll} \min & \sum_{e \in E} d_e x_e \\ \text{s.t.} & x(\delta(S)) \geq 2, \quad \forall \emptyset \subset S \subset \\ & x(\delta(v)) = 2, \quad \forall v \in V. \\ 0 \preceq x \preceq 1 \end{array}$$



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- Suffices to minimize  $x(\delta(S))$  over all nonempty  $S \subset V$ .
- This is min-cut in a weighted graph, which we can solve.